Question
The attack on the then British Prime Minister’s home last year was linked to Russian-backed proxies attempting to undermine our democracy, and it concerns me deeply that our nation has become so anaesthetised by online disinformation that we collectively shrugged and carried on doomscrolling. I commend the creation of a national centre for information defence to counter cognitive warfare, but given the continued threat of Russian cognitive warfare, may I ask the Foreign Secretary how we can co-operate with European partners to counter disinformation, shut down the networks and hold technology companies to account?
Answer
We do have a defence and security partnership with the European Union, but my hon. Friend speaks eloquently about these issues. As I said in an earlier answer, we want to do more work with the European Union on questions of information, and we will say more about that in the coming weeks. My hon. Friend also raised wider issues. Hybrid warfare is not just about information and misinformation; as we know from the recent incident in Leipzig, it is about sabotage, espionage, cyber-attacks and a range of other issues, and we need to be extremely vigilant about it.11% vibes
Verdict: RED (10/100)
The reply only partly addresses the question. It discusses co-operation with the EU on information issues and promises more work, but it names no concrete way of countering disinformation and leaves the detail to 'the coming weeks'. It does not address the questions about shutting down networks that spread disinformation or about holding technology companies to account, and its remarks on hybrid threats move to sabotage, espionage and cyber-attacks instead. The asker would likely need to follow up for specifics.
How we got there
| Question item | Coverage | Specificity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| How the Government can co-operate with European partners to counter disinformation | Partially Addressed | Hedged | The reply engages with co-operation with the EU on information issues and commits to 'do more work' there, but it names no concrete mechanism for countering disinformation and defers the detail to 'the coming weeks'. The defence-partnership statement is only background. |
| How the Government can shut down the networks spreading disinformation | Not Addressed | Generic | Nothing in the reply addresses shutting down networks that spread disinformation; the hybrid-warfare statements shift to sabotage, espionage and cyber-attacks instead. |
| How the Government can hold technology companies to account for disinformation | Not Addressed | Generic | The reply says nothing about holding technology companies to account, and the only related remarks are generic praise and vigilance language. |